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ABSTRACT 
Recent cut damages sustained on crewmember gloves 
during extravehicular activity (ISS) onboard the 
International Space Station (ISS) have been caused by 
contact with sharp edges or a pinch point according to 
analysis of the damages. One potential source are 
protruding sharp edged crater lips from micrometeoroid 
and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts on metallic 
handrails along EVA translation paths. A number of 
hypervelocity impact tests were performed on ISS 
handrails, and found that mm-sized projectiles were 
capable of inducing crater lip heights two orders of 
magnitude above the minimum value for glove abrasion 
concerns. Two techniques were evaluated for mitigating 
the cut glove hazard of MMOD impacts on ISS 
handrails: flexible overwraps which act to limit contact 
between crewmember gloves and impact sites, and; 
alternate materials which form less hazardous impact 
crater profiles. In parallel with redesign efforts to 
increase the cut resilience of EMU gloves, the 
modifications to ISS handrails evaluated in this study 
provide the means to significantly reduce cut glove risk 
from MMOD impact craters. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
During post-flight processing of STS-116, damage to 
crewmember Robert Curbeam’s Phase VI Glove 
Thermal Micrometeoroid Garment was discovered 
(shown in Figure 1). This damage consisted of: loss of 
RTV-157 palm pads on the thumb area on the right 
glove and a 0.75 inch cut in the Vectran adjacent to the 
seam and thumb pad (single event cut), constituting the 
worst glove damage ever recorded in “the history of 
going EVA for the U.S. program” [1] . The underlying 
bladder and restraint were found not be damaged. 
Evaluation of glove damage showed that the outer 
Vectran fibers were sliced as a result of contact with a 
sharp edge or pinch point rather than general wear or 
abrasion (commonly observed on the RTV pads). 
Damage to gloves was also noted on STS-118 [2] and 
STS-120 [3]. A potential source of EMU glove cut 
hazard is micrometeoid and orbital debris (MMOD) 
impact craters on ISS handrails. Returned flight surfaces 
(see e.g. nitrogen tank assembly handrail in Figure 2) 
have demonstrated the susceptibility of these structures 
to regular MMOD impacts. 
 
  
Figure 1. Damage to crewmember Curbeam’s Phase IV 
glove following EVA 3 of STS-116 
 
 
 
Figure 2. MMOD impacts on the returned nitrogen tank 
assembly handrail. Top: location of impacts; Below: 
impact craters 4, 5, 15 (left-to-right) 
 
Redesign efforts are currently underway to enhance the 
resiliency of EMU gloves to cut hazards. In the 
meantime, temporary reinforcements (TurtleSkin© 
patches) have been added to high wear areas (lower part 
of thumb and upper part of index finger). Parallel efforts 
have been made to characterize MMOD impact damage 
profiles on representative and actual ISS flight hardware 
and mitigate the cut hazard posed by these profiles on 
crewmember EMU gloves. In this paper, the results of 
these characterization and mitigation impact test studies 
are presented and suggestions for modifications to 
ground equipment yet to be flown are made. 
 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20090012274 2019-08-30T06:33:54+00:00Z
 2. HYPERVELOCITY IMPACT TESTING OF 
ISS HANDRAILS 
Two handrail configurations were selected for 
characterization of MMOD impact damage features on 
ISS handrails: a rectangular handrail with channelled 
edges (NASA part no. SDD33107728-073), and a 
tubular handrail (part number SDD39122635-001), both 
of which are shown in Figure 3.  
 
  
Figure 3: ISS handrail target configuration. Left: 
rectangular handrail; Right: tube handrail 
 
The rectangular handrail configuration has a nominal 
thickness of 1.27 mm (0.05”) which is reinforced to 
4.445 mm (0.175”) at the corners. The tubular handrail 
has a nominal thickness of 1.57 mm (0.62”). 
Dimensions of the handrails are provided in Figure 4. 
Both handrails are manufactured from Al 6061-T6. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Cross-sectional diagram of rectangular 
(upper) and tubular (lower) ISS handrails subject to 
testing (dimensions in inches) 
A total of 46 impact tests were performed on the 
handrail targets (all at ~7 km/s): 34 on the rectangular 
configuration and 12 on the tubular configuration. The 
impact tests considered a variety of impact locations and 
angles in order to provide a wide characterization base 
for the cut hazard assessment. Example of impact 
damages on the rectangular and tubular handrail targets 
are provided in Figure 5 and Figure 6 respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Impact damage on a rectangular ISS handrail 
induced by impact of a 0.10 cm diameter Al2017-T4 
sphere at 6.94 km/s with oblique (45°) incidence 
 
  
  
 
Figure 6: Impact damage on a tubular ISS handrail 
induced by impact of a 0.15 cm diameter Al2017-T4 
sphere at 6.95 km/s with normal (0°) incidence 
 
For the rectangular handrail configuration, typical entry 
hole diameters were 3-4 times that of the projectile 
 diameter. The damage profiles exhibited protruding 
crater lips in all cases, with a maximum height of 2.7 
mm for impact of a 1.5 mm diameter Al2017-T4 sphere 
at 6.86 km/s with oblique (45°) incidence (HITF08086). 
For this test, the projectile impacted upon the thickened 
corner section of the rectangular handrail. Impacts upon 
thicker sections of the handrail commonly resulted in 
damage profiles with more hazardous (i.e. higher) crater 
lip formations. Generally, it was observed that an 
increase in projectile diameter leads to an increase in the 
height of the protruding crater lip. For impacts causing 
damage to the rear side of the impacted structure (i.e. 
perforation or spallation), damage feature were also 
characterized. A maximum lip height of 4.6 mm was 
measured following impact of a 1.8 mm projectile at 
7.06 km/s at oblique (45°) incidence on the center of the 
handrail upper surface.  
 
For the tubular handrail configuration, entry hole 
diameters were also commonly 3-4 times the diameter 
of the projectile. However, impact crater lips did not 
protrude above the handrail surface as much as on the 
rectangular configuration. The more hazardous crater 
profiles on the rectangular handrail were found upon the 
thicker sections. Thus, damage profiles on the thin 
tubular handrails were not expected to protrude as 
significantly as on the reinforced sections of their 
rectangular counterparts. A maximum raised crater lip 
of 1.9 mm was measured for the tubular handrail, 
induced by impact of a 1.5 mm diameter Al2017-T4 
sphere at 6.95 km/s with normal incidence. None of the 
12 impact tests on the tubular handrail resulted in 
ejection of material from the rear side of the handrail 
target.  
 
Preliminary evaluation of glove damage has focused on 
crater edge heights above 37 microns due to abrasion 
concerns. This value represents 1/4th the diameter of the 
Vectran yarn used in the Thermal Micrometeoroid 
Garment (TMG) of the Phase IV EMU glove. The 
measured crater lip heights of all 46 handrail impact 
tests were two orders of magnitude larger than the 
cutoff for abrasion concerns. Thus, it is clearly 
demonstrated that MMOD impact upon ISS handrails 
are a plausible source of cut hazard for EVA 
crewmember gloves. 
 
3. MITIGATING CUT HAZARD OF MMOD 
IMPACT CRATERS 
Two alternate means of reducing the cut hazard of 
MMOD impact crater sites have been evaluated: 
 
• Flexible overwraps that can be added to existing 
handrails (such as ground equipment that has yet 
to fly) and would effectively act as padding, 
limiting contact between crater lips and 
crewmember gloves; and 
• Alternative materials for ISS handrails that limit 
the formation of hazardous crater profiles. 
 
3.1. Handrail Overwraps 
Four overwrap configurations were considered in the 
test program:  
• Silicon rubber coated felt-reusable surface 
insulation (FRSI); 
• Non-reticulated open cell polyether polyurethane 
foam (12.54 mm thick) with aluminized beta-
cloth cover (OCF+BC); 
• Double layer reticulated open cell polyether 
polyurethane foam (6.35 mm thick) with 
aluminized beta-cloth cover and intermediate 
layer (DROCF+BC); and 
• 16 layers of aluminized beta-cloth with Dacron 
netting spacers (Beta-cloth). 
 
As the flexible overwrap is intended to limit contact 
between EMU gloves and MMOD impact sites their 
performance was assessed in terms of their residual 
thickness when compressed by a 30 kg steel block. 
Although this load is significantly less than handrail 
design requirements for crewmember induced loads 
(220 lbs over a 3 inch length [4]), the variance in 
measured residual thickness is expected to be 
negligible. An overview of thickness (uncompressed 
and compressed) and areal weight of the overwrap 
configurations is provided in Table 1. 
 
Type Uncomp. 
thickness 
(mm) 
Comp. 
thickness 
(mm) 
Areal 
weight 
(g/cm2) 
FRSI 3.89 2.15 0.182 
OCF+BC 12.72 1.95 0.131 
DROCF+BC 12.74 1.98 0.100 
Beta-cloth 3.175 2.70 0.463 
Table 1: Handrail overwrap configuration properties 
 
The handrail is simulated by a 4.826 mm (0.19”) thick 
Al6061-T6 plate, to which the overwraps are clamped 
during testing. This target is representative of the 
reinforced corner sections of the rectangular handrail 
(see Figure 4), upon which the most hazardous crater 
profiles were generated during testing. Two impact tests 
were performed on the baseline target and each of the 
overwrap configurations. A summary of test conditions 
and damage measurements is provided in Table 2.  
 
3.1.1. Test Results and Analysis 
Normal impact of a 1.0 mm diameter Al2017-T4 sphere 
at ~6.8 km/s on the baseline Al6061-T6 target induced a 
4.2 mm diameter crater with a maximum depth of 2.2 
mm and a lip that protruded a maximum of 1.0 mm 
above the target surface. At nominally identical test 
conditions, all four overwrap configurations were able 
 Target Projectile 
diameter 
(mm) 
Impact 
velocity 
(km/s) 
Impact angle 
(deg) 
Crater 
dimensions 
(mm) 
Crater depth 
(mm) 
Lip height 
(mm) 
Al6061-T6 1.0 6.83 0 4.2×4.2 2.2 1.0 
Al6061-T6 1.5 6.87 45 6.9×6.4 2.9 0.8 
FRSI 1.0 6.55 0 3.4×3.4 1.2 0.3 
FRSI 1.5 6.95 45 4.7×6.5 1.2 0.7 
OCF+BC 1.0 6.98 0 1.1×1.3 0.9 0.1 
OCF+BC 1.5 6.85 45 3.1×3.1 1.5 0.3 
DROCF+BC 1.0 6.99 0 1.0×1.0 0.1 0.1 
DROCF+BC 1.5 7.03 45 2.3×2.5 1.4 0.8 
Beta-cloth 1.0 6.86 0 <0.1 0.0 <0.1 
Beta-cloth 1.5 6.94 45 <0.1 0.0 <0.1 
MMC 1.0 6.87 0 4.3×3.0 n/a 1.0 
CFRP 1.0 6.91 0 2.1×2.1 2.7 0.0 
Fiberglass 1.0 6.86 0 2.6×2.6 0.6 0.8 
FML 1.0 6.99 0 8.3×9.7 0.3 3.5 
Table 2: ISS handrail baseline, overwrap, and alternate materials test results and damage measurements 
 
to reduce the diameter, depth and protruding lip height 
of the baseline target crater. A comparison between the 
impact generated crater in the unshielded handrail and 
the handrails covered by flexible overwraps is given in 
Figure 7. The impact crater in the unshielded handrail 
target is clearly defined, with a well formed lip 
protruding above the plate surface. Of the overwrap 
configurations, only the FRSI target shows a clearly 
formed crater with a discernable lip. The OCF+BC 
target shows multiple small craters with minimally-
protruding lips, while the DROCF+BC and Beta-cloth 
target damages are limited to discoloration and shallow 
denting.  
 
For the oblique impact tests, a crater was formed in the 
baseline Al6061-T6 target with a diameter of 6.9 mm 
(maximum), a depth of 2.9 mm, and a maximum raised 
lip height of 0.8 mm. Similar to the normal impact tests, 
all four overwrap configurations were effective at 
reducing the height of the crater lip. In Figure 8 the 
FRSI target shows a cleanly formed crater with a 
protruding lip (smaller dimensions than the unshielded 
target). The OCF+BC target shows multiple overlapping 
craters, suggesting the projectile was fragmented upon 
impact with the beta-cloth cover. Although the craters 
are cleanly formed, there is minimal protrusion of 
material above the target surface. A similar damage 
profile is observed on the DROCF+BC target, which 
shows a single crater cleanly formed with reduced 
depth, diameter, and raised lip height than the 
unshielded target. The target plate shielded by the Beta-
cloth overwrap shows discoloration and a minimal 
amount of mechanical damage. 
 
3.2. Alternate Handrail Materials 
During hypervelocity impact an evacuation flow 
develops behind the shock wave during projectile 
penetration (i.e. “splash-back”). For ductile materials, 
this evacuation flow acts to form an uprange crater lip 
once the material is sufficiently cooled. For brittle 
materials, limited plastic flow is expected to minimize 
the formation of protruding crater lips. 
 
Four alternate materials were selected for the test 
program due to their low ductility and equivalent (or 
superior) tensile modulus and strength properties 
(compared to the baseline aluminium alloy): 
 
• Continuous Nextel 610 fiber reinforced pure 
aluminium (fiber content by volume, Vf = 40%) 
metal matrix composite (MMC); 
• Quasi-isotropic IM7/954-2A carbon fiber 
reinforced plastic (CFRP) laminate with plain 
weave fabric cover (Vf = 60%); 
• Woven glass fabric/halogen free epoxy type 
NP500CR fiberglass (Fiberglass); and 
• Fiber metal laminate (FML) with alternating 
layers of Al2024-T3 and S-2/FM94 glass/epoxy 
composite (trade name GLARE®). 
 
An overview of the alternate material target 
configurations is given in Table 3 (additional details can 
be found in [5]). 
 
Material Thickness 
(mm) 
Density 
(g/cm3) 
Elastic 
mod 
(GPa) 
Tensile 
strength 
(MPa) 
Al6061-T6 4.826 2.70 65.9 310 
MMC 3.3 3.30+ 207+ 1450+ 
CFRP 7.03 1.564* 167* 3105* 
Fiberglass 4.826 1.80 27.5 310 
FML 3.74 2.17 50 300 
* Calculated value; + Typical property 
Table 3: Alternate handrail material target 
configurations and key mechanical properties 
 
 Unshielded FRSI OCF+BC DROCF+BC Beta-cloth 
 
Figure 7: Comparison of impact crater profile in an unshielded ISS handrail-representative Al6061-T6 plate and 
overwrap-shielded plates impacted at normal incidence by a 1.0 mm diameter Al2017-T4 sphere at 6.77±0.22 km/s  
 
Unshielded FRSI OCF+BC DROCF+BC Beta-cloth 
 
Figure 8: Comparison of impact crater profile in an unshielded ISS handrail-representative Al6061-T6 plate and 
overwrap-shielded plates impacted at 45° by a 1.5 mm diameter Al2017-T4 sphere at 6.94±0.09 km/ 
 
One impact tests was performed on each of the four 
alternate handrail material targets. A summary of test 
impact conditions and target damage measurements is 
given in Table 2. Of the four alternate materials tested, 
two were found to reduce the height of protruding crater 
lips (compared to the baseline Al6061-T6 target) for the 
impact conditions considered, as shown in Figure 9. 
There was no measureable crater lip on the CFRP target, 
however there was a large amount of surface spallation 
about the impact site, including groups of rigid 
unidirectional fibers that are considered to pose a 
puncture risk. The outer fabric layer on the CFRP 
laminate is used to limit the amount of surface 
spallation; however it is shown that multiple layers may 
be required to prevent spallation of puncture-hazardous 
material. The other material to reduce the height of the 
crater lip was the NP500CR fibreglass. For this 
material, the area about the impact site contained 
fractured and delaminated glass fibers. Although 
extending above the target surface, these protrusions 
were not rigid, nor did they extend beyond the local 
impact site (see Figure 9). Unlike the CFRP, the epoxy 
has been completely removed from the protruding glass 
fibers and, as such, they are considered to pose minimal 
puncture risk. The GLARE fiber metal laminate had the 
highest crater lip, ~3.3 times that of the baseline 
aluminium alloy. In Figure 9 it can be observed that the 
outer aluminium layer of the FML peeled back from the 
composite layer, resulting in a large crater diameter with 
sharp petalled edges. Having a number of glass/epoxy 
composite layers on the outer surface of the laminate 
(instead of an aluminium alloy layer) may reduce the 
protrusion height of the crater lip. The Nextel 610/pure 
aluminium metal matrix composite provided a similar 
 Al6061-T6 MMC CFRP Fiberglass FML 
 
Figure 9: Comparison of impact crater profile in a simulated ISS handrail and alternate handrail materials impacted 
by a 1.0 mm diameter Al2017-T4 sphere at 6.91±0.08 km/s with normal incidence (0°) 
 
lip height to that of the baseline aluminium alloy. The 
outer layer of the MMC laminate is seen to have 
fractured about the impact site, resulting in minimal 
protrusion above the target surface. However, the 
second layer did not fracture in a similar manner, 
resulting in a 1.0 mm measured lip height. The MMC 
target was penetrated by the projectile, forming an exit 
hole that was raised 2.45 mm above the rear target rear 
side. Although the thickness of the MMC laminate was 
less than the baseline material, penetrating impacts on 
Al6061-T6 with larger projectiles resulted in rear side 
damage features less hazardous than that of the MMC. 
As such, the performance of the MMC is considered 
worse than the baseline aluminium alloy. 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
During extravehicular activity (EVA) on recent ISS 
missions, a number of incidences of crewmember glove 
damage have been reported. A potential source of these 
damages comes from contact between EMU gloves and 
sharp-lipped MMOD impact craters on metallic 
handrails.  A series of hypervelocity impact tests have 
been performed on ISS handrails to investigate and 
characterize the formation of impact craters.  Raised lips 
generated by the impact of mm-sized particles were 
found to exceed minimum heights required for glove 
abrasion by two orders of magnitude. The most 
hazardous crater formations were found to occur in the 
thickest sections of the handrail structures. Temporary 
efforts to increase the cut resilience of EMU gloves are 
currently in place, and more thorough design 
modifications are being investigated. Two potential 
modifications to ISS handrails have been evaluated in 
this paper to provide a complementary means of 
reducing EMU cut glove occurrences. 
 
Four flexible overwrap configurations suitable for 
retrofitting ground equipment were evaluated in the first 
phase of the study: felt-reusable surface insulation 
(FRSI), open cell polyether polyurethane foam with a 
beta cloth cover, double-layer open cell polyether 
polyurethane foam with beta cloth cover and 
intermediate layer, and a beta cloth blanket containing 
16 layers of beta cloth with intermediate Dacron 
spacers. These materials were selected based on their 
pre-existing certification and use in flight (with the 
exception of the polyurethane foams). The purpose of 
the overwrap is not to protect handrails from MMOD 
impact, rather to limit contact between impact craters 
and EVA crew gloves. All overwrap configurations 
were found to successfully meet this requirement (under 
compression of a 30 kg steel block). In addition, the 
magnitude of damage to the underlying handrail target 
was found to be reduced by all four overwrap 
configurations. 
 
In the second phase of the study four material 
alternatives to the current aluminium alloy were 
evaluated: Nextel 610/pure aluminium metal matrix 
composite (MMC), quasi-isotropic carbon fiber 
reinforced plastic (CFRP), woven fibreglass/epoxy 
composite, and a fiber metal laminate (FML) with 
alternating layers of Al6061-T6 and S-2/glass epoxy 
(trade name GLARE®). The materials were selected for 
their comparable (or superior) strength and stiffness 
properties, and for their low ductility. Of the four 
materials tested, only the fibreglass target was found to 
form a less hazardous damage profile than the baseline 
Al6061-T6 target. Although the CFRP laminate did not 
form a protruding crater lip, large surface fractures of 
rigid fiber groups were considered to represent a 
puncture risk. The fibreglass target impact crater was 
smaller in diameter and lip height than the baseline 
 material, and fragmented glass fibers about the impact 
site were soft and highly flexible. Although the GLARE 
FML performed significantly worse than the baseline 
aluminium alloy target, it is considered that 
modifications to the stacking sequence could provide 
improvements.  
 
In tandem with efforts to increase the puncture and cut 
resilience of Phase IV EMU gloves, modification of 
metallic ISS handrails through the addition of flexible 
overwraps or the use of alternate materials provide the 
means to significantly reduce the cut glove hazard of 
MMOD impact sites. 
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